Movement for a Socialist Future

Despite the limitations in Mike Marqusee’s critique of the Socialist Workers Party¹⁰ (see parts I and II), he is able to make many perceptive points about its political practice: “It is hardly new to note that blind loyalty to an organisation is a dangerous state of mind, and it saddens me that despite all the evidence of the left’s past errors, the SWP by and large will not engage in critical examination of their own history or current analysis and practice. When events embarrass them, the error is buried in silence. There is a fear of looking harsh realities or awkward questions in the face and a reluctance to spend time addressing them. There seems to be an imperative to move on to the next campaign or issue or intervention without pausing to assess the success or otherwise of previous efforts. I suspect that some of the leaders fear that if the membership is not kept constantly distracted, they might begin to ask awkward questions.”

What Marqusee cannot explain is the logic of the practice of the SWP. For what he has described seems to represent a recipe for the self-destruction and the demoralisation of the SWP. Marqusee’s analysis has an important weakness, because by presenting the SWP as essentially irrational he is unable to indicate why it has been able to become the main political representative of the “left”. It is only possible to make organisational and numerical advances up to a certain point, and then there is a process of political reckoning and the unfolding of the consequences of an essentially opportunist political practice. This point was most vividly shown in relation to the history of German Social Democracy in the early 20^th century, which made many impressive organisational advances in terms of increasing electoral support and growth in party membership. Nevertheless, when the objective situation demanded a qualitative leap in both theory and practice in relation to the outbreak of imperialist war, Social Democracy was not able to respond and a process of opportunist degeneration began.

On a much smaller scale, the SWP is entering a similar situation. For much of its history, the SWP (and its predecessor the International Socialist Organisation) based its theory and practice upon the view that capitalism had entered a long period of stability in the post-war period.¹¹ Hence, the economic and political perspectives were established for the view that the class struggle was basically about wages. In these terms of accommodating to the limitations of the spontaneous consciousness of militant workers the IS/SWP was able to make numerical gains in the 1970s. The necessity to transform militant struggles into political struggles against the Tory and Labour governments of the 1970s was effectively denied by the rigid emphasis on the importance of wages. By the mid-1970s, the IS/SWP considered that militancy was starting to subside, and the downturn theory was eventually adopted. This allowed the SWP to empirically deny the necessity and possibility of developing a perspective to challenge the Tory and Labour governments of the 1970s.

The onset of the reactionary Thatcher government created the first major crisis for the SWP, because their downturn perspective was in contradiction with the need to intensify the class struggle in order to defeat the Tories. In particular, the miners’ strike of 1984-85 showed that the transformation of a sectional and militant trade union action into a generalised class struggle against capital was crucial for victory. However, the SWP failed to respond to this political challenge caused by the intensification of the contradictions of capitalism, and instead persisted with their downturn theory. Hence, the only way that the SWP could try to gloss over the divergence between the requirements of the objective situation and their subjective and political limitations was to portray the miners strike as a ‘heroic’ trade union struggle that had little chance of victory. In these opportunist terms, the failings of the politics of the SWP could be presented as virtues and an expression of the “realism” of the situation.

Consequently, what was an important political limitation from the point of view of authentic revolutionary Marxism - the failure of the SWP to call for a general strike - was ideologically transformed into a virtue. Nevertheless, the SWP was only able to thrive in this situation because authentic revolutionary Marxism entered into a crisis in this period with the split in the Workers Revolutionary Party, which was connected to the demoralisation caused by the defeat of the miners. The WRP had been able to make important advances precisely because its perspectives were based upon what was necessary in a period of the intensification of class struggle. The crisis in the WRP meant that the SWP was able to present itself as the main expression of revolutionary politics, and so the possibility of a significant crisis in the SWP was overcome and displaced onto developments in the future.

The conditions for such a crisis only increased. For the SWP had only learnt from the miners’ strike that principled revolutionary politics were not required. It seemed possible to maintain the organisational cohesion of the party apparatus by putting forward the most modest and “realistic” politics of putting pressure on the state rather than developing a strategy for its revolutionary overthrow. These ideological and idealist illusions would become transformed into the expression of a political crisis in a situation where the SWP had the official leadership of a mass movement - the antiwar agitation - and when the necessity for a revolutionary strategy could no longer be displaced and avoided.

In the early 1990s, the SWP tried to respond ambitiously to its position of political domination within the British ‘left’. The downturn theory was unceremoniously ditched, and instead the view was adopted that what was occurring was the “1930’s in slow motion”. The demise of Stalinism and the development of the anti-capitalist movement was presented as the context for new political opportunities that would consolidate the political hegemony of the SWP over the “left”, especially as the expulsion of Militant from the Labour Party was creating a crisis for another rival organisation. In this situation, the SWP was presenting itself as the only credible and serious revolutionary organisation. The evaluation of the SWP in terms of its history was unimportant, because what was organisationally significant was its new found pre-eminence on the left. Alex Callinicos has summed up this empirical approach: “Political tendencies must be judged not primarily on their theory or their past, but on their responses to the challenges of the present.”¹²

What was being suggested was that people should join the SWP in terms of its present political record, and should not therefore make connections between its past and present. For Callinicos, there is no necessary connection between past and present, because all that matters is what is happening “now”, and so any “mistakes” of the past are considered to be irrelevant in relation to the carrying out of present political aims. This standpoint is most compatible with opportunism, because a principled revolutionary organisation would try to rectify past errors in order that they do not undermine the development of principled political practice in the present. However, the SWP does not have such concerns because what is important is its organisational credibility rather than the task of theoretical and political clarification. Any problems with the stance of the SWP on the miners’ strike, and any other situation, can be glossed over because the issue is not whether its stance is principled and in accordance with the requirements of the potential of the objective situation. Instead what is considered important is whether the SWP was able to make numerical gains and hold its own in comparison to rivals.

The SWP theoretically rejects the importance of historical memory, and the role of the party as the collective memory of the working class. Its opportunist character means that the past can only be a matter of embarrassment rather than the basis for reflection in order to suggest means of improvement and future development. The SWP always considers that its practice is basically adequate, because the criteria of adequacy is not the relation of party and class, but instead practice is narrowly defined as what is compatible with the organisational needs of the SWP. This is why the SWP does not reflect upon past errors, and is content to quickly move to new areas of struggle without making a balance sheet of past efforts. For the opportunist content of their politics means that they do not consider themselves accountable to the working class in relation to the role of their practice. So what is important is to find new areas of struggle where awkward questions about their past role will not be asked.

The development of a situation in which the SWP had political domination over the “left” eventually became the basis for the new emergence of the crisis in the organisation. It could no longer politically define its activity in terms of the downturn theory which had justified political passivity alongside the maintenance of organisational cohesion. Instead the SWP had to show initiative and try to take responsibility for developing the “left” in a manner which would challenge its existing marginalisation. Thus the SWP became involved in political regroupment initiatives like the Socialist Alliance, whilst trying to uphold the traditional organisational principle of the cohesion of the party. To the SWP, the Socialist Alliance could never be anything else than the expression of the will of the party. If it were to establish its own autonomy the prestige of the party might be undermined. Consequently, the Socialist Alliance itself could never be anything else than an expression of the potential for crisis within the SWP. It was one particular manifestation of the contradiction between the organisational imperatives of the SWP and what was genuinely required in order to build a real and genuine united front. This, of course, requires democracy, participation and genuine freedom of criticism. The first hint of criticism would plunge the Socialist Alliance into crisis, because this would be a challenge to the organisational prestige of the SWP. This is why the Socialist Alliance has been in a state of perpetual crisis, and why the SWP has formally acted to purge the organisation and establish its total political control. Essentially Marqusee and company have participated in a charade.

Callinicos describes these ‘unity’ initiatives of the SWP in the following terms: “Organising on the basis of a broader and more ambiguous programmatic basis may sometimes be a necessary phase in the process of building a mass revolutionary party but a looser party is no substitute for the real thing.” Thus it was necessary to make theoretical and political concessions in order to construct united fronts that were still controlled by the party. These united fronts were only to be shadows of the party itself, because what was important was to build the party, which was to remain the central organisational principle of the SWP that guided its political practice. The united front could not have any dynamism of its own because this could challenge the role of the party. Indeed, the requirements of activity meant that the party had to maintain itself as the distinctive essence and controlling mechanism of the united front: “The relative ideological homogeneity of a revolutionary Marxist party gives it greater capacity for rapid and decisive action than looser, more programmatically ambiguous formations.”

In this way, the conception of the organisational superiority of the party in relation to the united front is the justification for the party to always try to establish its dominance over the united front, or else there is no real value in the united front. It was just about possible to organisationally sustain this conception in relation to the Anti-Nazi League and Globalise Resistance, which were effectively party fronts, and even to temporarily uphold this approach in relation to the Socialist Alliance. But it was not possible to uphold this outlook in relation to the dynamic and mass anti-war movement. The attempt to maintain organisational control over the STWC by the SWP could only be upheld by a process of further political degeneration that meant the SWP constructed a de facto alliance with the Stalinist Communist Party of Britain. The demands of organisational fetishism, and upholding the narrow prestige of the party, had led to an opportunist alliance that explicitly rejected the possibility of any revolutionary strategy and the struggle to overthrow New Labour. So the very moment of triumph for the SWP was expression of the most vivid re-emergence of the crisis of the SWP, because its organisational control of the SWTC meant the complete repudiation of any conception of revolutionary leadership. The semblance of leadership in terms of organisational control meant the lack of any principled leadership and the rejection of even formal adherence to revolutionary politics. Instead, the SWP veered towards the stance of popular frontism with a reliance on bourgeois politics as the basis of getting the government to change its policies. This opportunism actually did nothing to strengthen the organisational credibility of the SWP. The manoeuvres to try and resolve this crisis, such as the proposed Peace and Justice party, have only intensified this crisis.

So, an important aspect of the development of the crisis of the SWP is that it has not been possible to reconcile its aspiration for organisational homogeneity of the various “united fronts” it is involved in with the potential for dynamic pluralism should they develop into a mass movement. This is the very problem that the SWP was confronted with in relation to the anti-war movement. The answer of the SWP was not to try and develop political leadership on the basis of facilitating the fullest expression of the potential of the anti-war movement. On the contrary, it was necessary to ensure that activities only took place with the permission of the STWC elite. This formal conception of the united front emphasised maximum organisational rigidity at the expense of the political clarity and development of initiative. In words, the SWP holds a different view of the united front. Callinicos argues that the political attitude towards the united front should be based upon ideological clarity: “Nevertheless the development of a strong Marxist pole within the movement depends on the willingness of revolutionaries to engage in ideological struggle.” In practice, it is ideological struggle which is always sacrificed in favour of the priority of organisational influence.

The SWP become famous in the STWC for not wanting to talk about politics and instead emphasising the importance of activity. On this basis of glossing over the importance of politics they hoped to grow numerically. But this opportunist stance rebounded on them because STWC supporters had no reason to join the SWP. The very rejection of the importance of ideological clarity meant that the SWP had effectively dissolved itself into the STWC, and had undermined the requirements of political struggle. The opportunist schema of the SWP to use the STWC as a launch pad for overcoming its political marginalisation was in tatters. The perspective of the SWP to recruit STWC activists into the SWP on the most minimal basis was undermined by the very opportunism of the SWP. The result was a new crisis.

The crisis of the SWP that occurred in the miners’ strike had returned in a new context because of the contradiction between its limited conception of leadership and the strategic requirements of the mass movement against the war in Iraq. The SWP does not connect its political practice to a careful analysis of what is objectively necessary in order to advance the class struggle in a principled manner. Instead the SWP subjectively considers that it is possible to “cheat” objective political requirements and instead uphold politics that are based upon the illusion that it is possible to reform capitalism in a progressive manner. The principled approach of the most intransigent opposition to a bourgeois government carrying out the imperialist war was diluted into the populist stance of protest and putting pressure on New Labour to change its policies. This opportunism is not without its effects, because it has contributed to a demoralisation and disorientation of the anti-war movement. So the effect of the SWP putting its organisational needs before the requirements of the mass movement has reawakened the crisis of the SWP, because its lack of leadership is all too apparent. The end result is a collection of opportunist manoeuvres in order to divert its membership from asking awkward questions about recent developments.

10 Mike Marqusee, Formations for the Next Left, www.signofthetimes.org.uk

11 For an extended analysis see Phil Sharpe’s evaluation of Tony Cliff’s autobiography, www.socialistfuture.org.uk

12 Alex Callinicos, Regroupment, Realignment and the Revolutionary Left, 2002

Now read: Part 4: Developing a revolutionary alternative

Phil Sharpe examines what lies behind the moves by the Socialist Workers Party to form a Peace and Justice Party with representatives of the Muslim community.

In the third of a four-part series, he examines the background to mounting criticism of the SWP’s methods and its growing internal crisis.

Part 2: Partisanship and the truth

Part 4: Developing a revolutionary alternative

or download the complete article (pdf file 94kb)